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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tyson Irwin Racehorse appeals from the judgment of the district court entered
upon his guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. On appeal Racehorse argues the
district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Quinn Steimlosk is the Senior Loss Prevention Specialist at Albertsons grocery
store. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 10, L. 23 – p. 13, L.1) One of Mr. Steimlosk’s primary duties is to
catch shoplifters. (See id.) Mr. Steimlosk saw Racehorse go to the service deli and get a
dinner deal bag. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 13, L. 9 – p. 15, L. 7.) Racehorse then took some
Astroglide off the shelf and concealed it in the dinner deal bag. (Id.) Racehorse got two
beers from the cooler. (Id.) Racehorse then used the self-checkout and scanned the
dinner deal bag and only one of the two beers. (Id.)
Mr. Steimlosk and another store employee waited until Racehorse passed through
the first set of exit doors before they stopped Racehorse. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 15, L. 8 – p. 17,
L. 16.) Mr. Steimlosk told Racehorse that he was with the Loss Prevention Department
and told him that they needed to speak with him about the items he failed to purchase.
(Id.) Racehorse cooperated, and they went to the office. (Id.)
Once they were in the office, Mr. Steimlosk asked Racehorse to place his
purchased items on the counter and to empty his pockets, show his waistline and remove
his jacket. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 19, L. 15 – p. 21, L. 11.) Mr. Steimlosk asked him to do these
things for “the safety of [himself] and other associates and customers” and to recover any
1

stolen merchandise. (Id.) Racehorse removed several items from his pockets, including
cash and a syringe. (Id.) Mr. Steimlosk noticed a pack of cigarettes in Racehorse’s
jacket, but he just set the jacket aside. (Id.) The Astroglide was located in the dinner deal
bag, and the second, unpaid for, beer was in one of the shopping bags. (Id.) The pack of
cigarettes remained in Racehorse’s jacket. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 17-20, p. 37, Ls. 1419.) Mr. Steimlosk talked to Racehorse about his failure to purchase the Astroglide and
second beer. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 21, L. 25 – p. 22, L. 18.) Mr. Steimlosk then contacted the
Pocatello Police Department and requested they send an officer. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 22, Ls.
19-24.)
Officer Miller was dispatched to Albertsons in response to Mr. Steimlosk’s report
of an individual concealing items in the store. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 55, Ls. 7-13.) Mr.
Steimlosk informed Officer Miller that Racehorse failed to pay for the Astroglide and one
of the beers. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 24, L. 21 – p. 25, L. 5, p. 57, L. 11 – p. 60, L. 1.) Officer
Miller gave Racehorse Miranda 1 warnings. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 57, L. 11 – p. 60, L. 1.)
Racehorse told Officer Miller he would answer questions. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 60, Ls. 2-7.)
Racehorse admitted to concealing one item with the intent to take it from the store, but
claimed it was an accident he did not pay for the second item. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 60, Ls. 1223.) Officer Miller asked Racehorse about the syringe. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 60, L. 24 – p. 64,
L. 21.) Racehorse claimed he was holding the syringe for a family member, who needed
it for medical purposes. (Id.)

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Officer Miller asked Racehorse if he had anything illegal in his jacket. (2/23/17
Tr., p. 65, L. 21 – p. 66, L. 21.) Racehorse said, “No. You can check.” (Id.) Officer
Miller clarified and asked if it was okay if he checked the jacket, and Racehorse said
“Yes.” (Id.) Officer Miller checked the jacket and found, in the right front pocket, a
packet of cigarettes. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 66, L. 22 – p. 67, L. 13.) Inside the packet of
cigarettes Officer Miller found a small plastic bag containing a white crystalline
substance. (Id.) The white crystalline substance appeared to be methamphetamine. (Id.)
Officer Miller placed Racehorse under arrest. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 67, L. 14 – p. 68, L. 22.)
During the search incident to arrest Officer Miller found another bag containing what
appeared to be methamphetamine in Racehorse’s right front small change pocket. (Id.)
The state charged Racehorse with possession of methamphetamine with the intent
to deliver and with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 71-74.) Racehorse filed a
motion to suppress, arguing that any evidence obtained from Racehorse was the product
of an unconstitutional search and should be suppressed. (R., pp. 89-90.) The district
court held a hearing. (R., pp. 93-94.)
Mr. Steimlosk testified that he observed the officer read Racehorse the Miranda
warnings and saw the officer search and find the baggies with a crystal substance.
(2/23/17 Tr., p. 25, L. 10 – p. 26, L. 11.) Officer Miller testified that his conversation
with Racehorse was civil and Racehorse was cooperative. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 66, Ls. 3-12.)
Nicole Arzola, the front end assistant manager/cashier at Albertsons who assisted Mr.
Steimlosk, testified that she was not sure when the cigarettes were removed from
Racehorse’s jacket. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 87, L. 16 – p. 91, L. 23.) However, she thought the
3

cigarettes might have been removed from the pocket before the police arrived. (Id.)
Officer Cartwright testified, but he did not recall all of the items that Officer Miller pulled
from Racehorse’s pockets. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 94, L. 3 – p. 99, L. 7 2.) After the hearing both
parties submitted briefs. (See 2/23/17 Tr., p. 105, L. 7 – p. 107, L. 17; R., pp. 100-116.)
The district court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order denying
Racehorse’s motion to suppress. (R., pp. 117-124.) The district court found that Mr.
Steimlosk’s request that Racehorse empty his pockets was done for his own purposes and
law enforcement did not know or consent to the search and thus the Fourth Amendment
was not implicated. (See id.) The district court also found that there was no evidence
that Officer Miller coerced Racehorse into granting consent to search his jacket. (See id.)
The district court found there was substantial and competent evidence that Racehorse
freely and voluntarily gave his consent to search his jacket, where the cigarette pack and
the first baggie of methamphetamine were found. (R., pp. 121-122.)
Racehorse and the state entered into a Rule 11 Plea Bargain Agreement. (R., pp.
133-135.) Under the terms of the agreement, Racehorse agreed to plead guilty to the
amended charge of possession of methamphetamine and reserved the right to appeal the
suppression ruling. (See id.) The agreement also bound the court to impose a sentence
that would run concurrently with Racehorse’s pending parole violation. (See 5/8/17 Tr.,

2

The pages of the transcript file appear to be slightly out of order. After page 96, the
transcript of the February 23, 2017 suppression hearing abruptly ends, and the transcript
of the July 10, 2017 sentencing hearing begins. However, after the July 10, 2017
sentencing transcript, the February 23, 2017 suppression hearing transcript restarts on
page 97.
4

p. 111, L. 5 – p. 112, L. 7.) Racehorse entered a guilty plea. (R., pp. 150-152; 5/8/17 Tr.,
p. 108, L. 5 – p. 120, L. 5.) The district court sentenced Racehorse to three years with 10
months fixed, to run concurrently with his sentences in other cases. (R., pp. 160-161,
163-166; 7/10/17 Tr., p. 141, L. 19 – p. 144, L. 1.) Racehorse timely appealed. (R., pp.
167-170.)

5

ISSUE
Racehorse states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Racehorse’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Racehorse failed to show the district court erred when it denied Racehorse’s
motion to suppress?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Racehorse’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Mr. Steimlosk asked Racehorse to empty his pockets and place the items from his

pockets on the table.

(R., p. 118.)

No police officers were present, nor did law

enforcement know or consent to Mr. Steimlosk’s request. (R., pp. 119-120.) The district
court found that this search did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because Mr.
Steimlosk was a private citizen and not a government official. (See id.) On appeal,
Racehorse argues that the district court erred when it found Mr. Steimlosk was not acting
as a government official. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.) Racehorse is mindful that
there was “substantial evidence” to support the district court’s finding, but nonetheless
argues the district court clearly erred. (See id.) Racehorse’s argument is without support
in the record and in law.
The district court also found that Racehorse freely and voluntarily gave consent to
Officer Miller to search his jacket (sometimes referred to as a coat) in which Officer
Miller found the cigarette pack that contained the first baggie of methamphetamine. (R.,
pp. 121-122.)

On appeal, Racehorse challenges the district court’s finding that the

cigarette pack was in Racehorse’s jacket when Racehorse gave Officer Miller consent to
search it. And, pointing to evidence that he contends shows the cigarette pack was
actually on the table, Racehorse argues Officer Miller’s search of the cigarette pack

7

exceed the scope of his consent. 3 (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-10.) Again Racehorse is
“mindful” that there is substantial evidence that the cigarette pack was in Racehorse’s
jacket, but nonetheless argues that the district court clearly erred. (See id.) Racehorse’s
argument is without support in the record and in law.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate court

applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328
(2012) (citing State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)). The
appellate court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous but will freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to
the facts found. Id.

C.

Racehorse Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court’s Findings That
Mr. Steimlosk Was Acting As A Private Individual And That Racehorse’s
Cigarette Pack Was In His Jacket When Officer Miller Asked To Search
Racehorse’s Jacket
The district court found that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated when Mr.

Steimlosk asked Racehorse to empty his pockets because Mr. Steimlosk was a private
individual who was not conducting a search on the behalf of law enforcement. (R., pp.

3

Racehorse raised this issue below. (See R., pp. 101-103.) Although the district court
did not explicitly find Officer Miller’s search was within the scope of Racehorse’s
consent, it implicitly did so when it concluded Officer Miller discovered the cigarette
pack while searching Racehorse’s jacket pursuant to Racehorse’s voluntary consent.
8

119-11.) The district court also found there was substantial and competent evidence that
Racehorse freely and voluntarily gave his consent to Officer Miller to search his jacket, in
which the cigarette pack and first baggie of methamphetamine were found. (R., pp. 121122.) Racehorse has failed to show the district court clearly erred in either determination.

1.

Mr. Steimlosk Was Acting As A Private Individual And Thus His Request
That Racehorse Empty His Pockets Does Not Implicate The Fourth
Amendment

Mr. Steimlosk’s request that Racehorse empty his pockets and place items on the
table did not even implicate the Fourth Amendment because Mr. Steimlosk was a private
citizen and not a government official. “It is firmly established that evidence obtained
through a private search, even though wrongfully conducted, is not excludable under the
fourth amendment unless government officials instigated the search or otherwise
participated in a wrongful search.” State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 517, 887 P.2d 57, 62
(Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Pontier, 103 Idaho 91, 94, 645 P.2d 325, 328 (1982);
State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 519, 716 P.2d 1288, 1291 (1986); State v. Castillo, 108
Idaho 205, 207, 697 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct.App.1985)). “However, where a private party
acts as an agent of the State in effecting a search, Fourth Amendment protections are
implicated.” State v. Breese, 160 Idaho 841, 843, 379 P.3d 1111, 1113 (Ct. App. 2016)
(citing United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir.1981); Kopsa, 126 Idaho at
517, 887 P.2d at 62). “The burden of proving governmental involvement in a search
conducted by a private citizen rests on the party objecting to the evidence.” Id. (citing
Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517, 887 P.2d at 62). There is a “gray area” between the extremes of
“overt governmental participation in a search and the complete absence of such
9

participation.” Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517, 887 P.2d at 62 (citing State v. Crawford, 110
Idaho 577, 579, 716 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Ct. App. 1986); United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d
788, 791 (9th Cir.1981)). “Gray area” cases should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis,
referring to certain general principles. Breese, 160 Idaho at 843, 379 P.3d at 1113 (citing
Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517, 887 P.2d at 62)). “One such principle is that de minimis or
incidental contacts between a citizen and law enforcement prior to or during the course of
a search do not subject the search to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.” Id. at 843-844, 379
P.3d at 1113-1114 (citing Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517, 887 P.2d at 62). “In order to bring a
private citizen’s actions within the purview of the Fourth Amendment, the government
must be involved either directly as a participant or indirectly as an encourager.” Id. at
844, 379 P.3d at1114 (citations omitted). “Thus, when analyzing whether the person
conducting the search is acting as an instrument or agent of the government, we consider
two critical factors—whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive
conduct and whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement
efforts or further his or her own ends.” Id. (citing Walther, 652 F.2d at 791; Kopsa, 126
Idaho at 517, 887 P.2d at 62).
The district court found that law enforcement did not even know about Mr.
Steimlosk’s search. (R., pp. 120-121.) The district court also found that Mr. Steimlosk
conducted the search for his own ends and the search was not intended to assist law
enforcement. (Id.)
Therefore, this Court concludes that law enforcement did not know or consent to
Steimlosk’s requirement that Racehorse empty his pockets. Furthermore,
Steimlosk’s requirement that all persons detained for shoplifting empty their
pockets is not done to assist law enforcement, but is to protect the safety of
10

Steimlosk and other staff at the store. As such, the search conducted by Steimlosk
prior to law enforcement arriving on scene was initiated by Steimlosk for his own
purposes and not for the benefit of law enforcement, and the protections afforded
under the Fourth Amendment are therefore not implicated.
(R., pp. 120-121.)
On appeal, “Racehorse acknowledges that he presented no evidence that the
officer knew of or acquiesced in Mr. Steimlosk’s request that Mr. Racehorse empty his
pockets, but he asserts that Mr. Steimlosk intended to aid the government when making
that request.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 8 (citing Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517, 887 P.2d at 62).)
Racehorse argues that, because Mr. Steimlosk did not tell Racehorse he could put his
items back into his pocket, Mr. Steimlosk was attempting to leave the items on the table,
which would aid law enforcement. (See id.) Racehorse argues the district court’s factual
findings were clearly erroneous. (See id.) Racehorse’s argument is unsupported by the
record and the law.
As acknowledged by Racehorse, the district court’s factual finding is supported by
substantial evidence. (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) Mr. Steimlosk’s request that Racehorse
empty his pockets was not intended to aid the police. Mr. Steimlosk testified that he
asked Racehorse to empty his pockets, for “the safety of [himself] and other associates
and customers” and to recover any stolen merchandise. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 19, L. 15 – p. 21,
L. 11.)
Q.
do?

So when you got to the office area that were you headed to, what did you

A.
I asked Mr. Racehorse to place the purchased items that were in bags
down on the counter. I asked him to empty his pockets, pulled them inside out,
show me his waistline, show me his sockline, and take – remove his jacket.
11

Q.
And why do you have – I guess, why did you ask Mr. Racehorse to do
those various things and why did you check those portions of his person?
A.
For the safety of myself and other associates and customers, to remove all
merchandise and recover all merchandise that was not paid for and to validate that
there is no weapons on the subject, for my safety and the safety of our employees
and customers.
(2/23/17 Tr., p. 19, L. 15 – p. 20, L. 6.)
Mr. Steimlosk not telling Racehorse to put the items back into his pockets also
was not intended to aid police. Mr. Steimlosk testified that telling a shoplifter to put
items back into his pockets was something he simply did not do. (See (2/23/17 Tr., p. 36,
Ls. 6-24.)
Q.
Okay. And after all of those items were removed from his person, did he
place them on the table or the counter or whatever it was?
A.

Yes.

Q.
And after you determined that there was no stolen items on his person, and
no weapons on his person, did you instruct him that he could put those items back
in his pockets?
A.

No, I did not.

Q.

Why is that?

A.

Um, it’s not something that I do with any subject ever.

Q.
Well, I know you say it’s not something you do. Did you want the police
to observe that when they showed up?
A.

Not necessarily, no. It’s just my standard procedure that –

(Id.) Thus, there is substantial and competent evidence to support the district court’s
finding that Mr. Steimlosk’s search was not done with the purpose of assisting law
enforcement. Racehorse has failed to show the finding is clearly erroneous.
12

However, even if the district court did clearly err when it determined that Mr.
Steimlosk did not intend to assist law enforcement, it does not matter. Whether a private
individual intended to assist law enforcement only becomes a factor in the “gray area”
cases. See Breese, 160 Idaho at 843, 379 P.3d at 1113; Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517, 887
P.2d at 62. “Gray area” cases only arise when governmental participation is between the
extremes of “overt governmental participation in a search and the complete absence of
such participation.” Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517, 887 P.2d at 62 (citations omitted). This is
not a “gray area” case.

Here, there was a complete absence of governmental

participation. No officer was present for the initial search. Law enforcement did not
even know about Mr. Steimlosk’s search, let alone consent to such a search. (See R., pp.
120-121.) There is a complete absence of governmental participation and thus the “gray
area” analysis is irrelevant.
In addition, Racehorse has failed to show he is entitled to suppression of the
methamphetamine. When a defendant moves to suppress evidence the defendant bears
the threshold burden of showing a factual nexus between the illegality and the state’s
acquisition of the evidence. See State v. Kapelle, 158 Idaho 121, 127, 344 P.3d 901, 907
(Ct. App. 2014); State v. Dahl, 162 Idaho 541, 400 P.3d 629, 634 (Ct. App. 2017). The
first baggie of methamphetamine was discovered after Racehorse consented to Officer
Miller’s search of his jacket. (See 2/23/17 Tr., p. 65, L. 21– p. 67, L. 13.) The second
baggie was found after Officer Miller placed Racehorse under arrest and searched him.
(2/23/17 Tr., p. 67, L. 14 – p. 68, L. 22.) Racehorse asks to suppress “any evidence

13

seized as a result” of Mr. Steimlosk’s search, but has failed to show that the evidence
would not have been discovered but for allegedly unconstitutional conduct.

2.

There Is Substantial And Competent Evidence That The Cigarette Pack
Was In Racehorse’s Jacket When Officer Miller Asked For, And
Received, Consent To Search The Jacket

The district court found that Racehorse gave voluntary consent to search his
jacket. (R., pp. 121-122.)
The facts in this case show that after arriving at the Albertson’s store, Officer
Miller informed the Defendant of his Miranda rights, and the Defendant freely
agreed to talk. Officer Miller and Racehorse then discussed why Racehorse was
in possession of a syringe. Based upon the answers provided by Racehorse,
Officer Miller’s training and experience led him to believe that individuals
possessing syringes may also possess illegal controlled substances, prompting
Officer Miller to ask Racehorse if he could search his jacket. Racehorse agreed to
Officer Miller’s request and gave permission to search. (See Suppression Hrg. At
57:15-60:21.) Based upon the testimony of Officer Miller regarding the events of
the day in question and a review of the totality of the circumstances, this Court
finds that there is substantial and competent evidence sufficient to demonstrate
that Racehorse freely and voluntarily gave his consent to that search of his jacket.
There is no evidence of coercion.
(R., p. 122.)
A warrantless search conducted pursuant to valid consent does not violate the
Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations
omitted); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). Consent is valid if it
is free and voluntary.

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26 (citations omitted).

The

voluntariness of an individual’s consent is a question of fact to be determined based upon
the totality of the circumstances.

Varie, 135 Idaho at 852, 26 P.3d at 35 (citing

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49). In order to be valid, consent cannot be the result of
duress or coercion, either direct or implied. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.
14

Whether a consent to a search was voluntary is a question of fact, the
determination of which is reviewed on appeal for clear error. State v. Reynolds, 146
Idaho 466, 472, 197 P.3d 327, 333 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 648,
181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008). “Findings will not be deemed clearly erroneous if
they are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Stewart, 145 Idaho at 648, 181
P.3d at 1256 (quoting State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App.
2006)).
“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth
Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable
person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-189
(1990); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-502 (1983) (opinion of WHITE, J.); id., at
514, (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting)). The United State Supreme Court explained, “The
scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object.” Id. (citing United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)).

“A reasonable person may be expected to know that

narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container.” Id.
On appeal, Racehorse does not challenge the finding that Officer Miller had valid
consent to search Racehorse’s jacket.

(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-10.)

Instead

Racehorse argues that the district court’s factual finding that the cigarette pack was in
Racehorse’s jacket was clearly erroneous. (See id.) Racehorse is “mindful” that there is
substantial evidence supporting the district court’s finding, but nonetheless argues the
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finding is clearly erroneous. (See id.) The district court did not clearly err; there was
substantial competent evidence that the cigarette pack was in Racehorse’s jacket.
Mr. Steimlosk testified that he saw the cigarette pack in Racehorse’s jacket, but
just set it aside.
Q.
And did you observe anything that [Racehorse] removed from his person
when you asked him to empty his pockets? Checked his waistband? His socks?
A.
Yes. Mr. Racehorse removed several items. There was a large quantity of
cash, there was a needle, there was – there was a pack of cigarettes that was in the
jacket, and I did not – I just set the jacket – after confirming that that was all that
was in the jacket, I just set that aside.
(2/23/17 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 11-21.) Mr. Steimlosk further testified that the cigarette pack was
still in Racehorse’s jacket when Racehorse took off the jacket:
Q.

Ok. And you said something about a pack of cigarettes in the coat?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did he remove those as well?

A.

No. He removed the jacket.

Q.

And you’re saying the cigarettes were still in the jacket?

A.

The cigarettes were still in the jacket, yes.

(2/23/17 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 12-20.) He also testified the cigarettes were still in the jacket
when the police arrived:
Q.
And it’s your testimony that the cigarettes were not removed from the coat
pocket before the police arrived?
A.
I felt the coat pockets and I saw a pack of cigarettes in there, but I didn’t
remove the cigarettes.
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(2/23/17 Tr., p. 37, Ls. 14-19.) Mr. Steimlosk repeatedly testified that the cigarette pack
remained in Racehorse’s jacket pocket. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 38, L. 21 – p. 39, L. 14, p. 42, Ls.
13-18, p. 43, L. 4 – p. 44, L. 2.)
Officer Miller testified that he spoke to Racehorse about the syringe to determine
whether it was drug paraphernalia. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 61, L. 21 – p. 64, L. 25.) Officer
Miller asked Racehorse if he had anything illegal in his coat. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 65, L. 21 –
p. 66, L. 21.) Racehorse said “No. You can check.” (Id.) Officer Miller then clarified
that it was okay that he check the coat. (Id.) Racehorse said “Yes.” (Id.)
Q.

And upon him telling you that, how did you proceed?

A.

I searched the pockets of the black Carhartt jacket that was on the counter.

Q.

And during that search, what did you discover, if anything?

A.

In his right front pocket of the coat there was a pack of cigarettes.

Q.

And what did you do with that pack of cigarettes?

A.

I opened it to look inside.

Q.

And what did you observe?

A.

A small plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance.

(2/23/17 Tr. p. 66, L. 22 – p. 67, L. 10; see also p. 78, L. 25 – p. 79, L. 3.) The only
potentially contrary evidence came from Ms. Arzola, who testified that she was not sure
when the cigarettes were removed from Racehorse’s jacket. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 87, L. 16 – p.
91, L. 23.) But she thought the cigarettes may have been out of the pocket before the
police arrived. (Id.) However, she could not remember if it was Mr. Steimlosk or the
police officer who removed the cigarettes from Racehorse’s jacket. (2/23/17 Tr., p. 88,
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Ls. 8-14.) Regardless, even if there is conflicting testimony (which there really is not
here), the resolution of those conflicts were the province of the district court. Here the
district court found that the cigarette pack was in Racehorse’s jacket and Racehorse gave
valid consent to Officer Miller to search his jacket. Racehorse has failed to show the
court’s finding was clearly erroneous and, thus, has failed to show any basis for
suppression.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court
DATED this 15th day of March, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson___________________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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